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Transcending Net Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet
Abstract
The past few years have witnessed a once-obscure issue known as “net neutrality” blow up into arguably the
most publicized policy debate in US telecommunications history. An untold story is how this relatively
technical debate spilled outside the rarefied airs of Congressional Committees and the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) eighth floor to rage across the blogosphere, major newspapers,
YouTube clips, and episodes of The Daily Show to become, if not a household phrase, a topic of popular
debate involving millions of Americans. One explanation is that, at its root, the net neutrality debate is far
more significant than a squabble among technocrats. Rather, it is first and foremost a normative debate, one
that will determine the role of the Internet in a democratic society, with profound implications for the daily
welfare of millions of citizens who rely on the Internet as a critical resource. Unfortunately, it is such
normative concerns, along with related political and historical contexts, that have been least explored in much
of the net neutrality scholarship to date. This article aims to address these gaps while expanding the
parameters of the existing debate.
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E D I T E D  B Y  D L A  P I P E R
 Sascha D. Meinrath and Victor 
W. Pickard 
 T
he past few years have witnessed a once-obscure issue 
known as “net neutrality” blow up into arguably 
the most publicized policy debate in US telecom-
munications history. An untold story is how this 
relatively technical debate spilled outside the rarefied 
airs of Congressional Committees and the Federal 
Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) eighth floor to 
rage across the blogosphere, major newspapers, YouTube 
clips, and episodes of  The Daily Show to become, if not 
a household phrase, a topic of popular debate involving 
millions of Americans. One explanation is that, at its 
root, the net neutrality debate is far more significant 
than a squabble among technocrats. Rather, it is first 
and foremost a normative debate, one that will deter-
mine the role of the Internet in a democratic society, 
with profound implications for the daily welfare of mil-
lions of citizens who rely on the Internet as a critical 
resource. Unfortunately, it is such normative concerns, 
along with related political and historical contexts, that 
have been least explored in much of the net neutrality 
scholarship to date. This article aims to address these 
gaps while expanding the parameters of the existing 
debate.  
 “Network neutrality,” defined broadly, is non-
 discriminatory interconnectedness among data commu-
nication networks that allows users to access the content 
and to run the services, applications, and devices of their 
choice. In essence, network neutrality forbids preferen-
tial treatment of specific content, services, applications, 
and devices that can be integrated into the network 
infrastructure. This principle has been the foundation 
for rapid innovation and the Internet’s relative open-
ness. As Congress debates whether network neutrality 
protections should be written into current legislation, 
the battle lines have been drawn between large tele-
communications companies that own the pipes, on one 
side, and Internet content companies and public interest 
groups on the other. Although scholarship has begun to 
catch up with the net neutrality debate, the majority 
of this work has failed to connect this issue with larger 
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ramifications that arise while striving toward a democratic 
Internet.  
 In this article, we attempt to broaden the net neutral-
ity debate while briefly taking stock of recent scholarship. 
In doing so, we critically evaluate the current network 
neutrality debate and offer a set of technical and policy 
guidelines for a new, more broadly defined open Internet. 1 
Specifically, we submit that beyond redefining network 
neutrality, we must connect issues usually dealt with sepa-
rately—issues that are actually a subset of one overarch-
ing concern: the struggle for a democratic Internet. We 
conclude with an exploration of the social and political 
impacts of this broader conception of network neutrality. 
These recommendations, we argue, provide a proactive 
foundation for creating a more open and participatory 
Internet. This project builds upon an earlier formulation 
that we referred to as the “New Network Neutrality.” 
 WHY NET NEUTRALITY MATTERS 
 Network neutrality helps ensure that telecommunica-
tion infrastructures remain “dumb,” delivering content and 
services equally in a best-effort manner that treats data/
content delivery equitably. This best effort entails packets 
being delivered in a first-in first-out method at the maxi-
mum speed possible given network constraints. Under a 
framework of network neutrality, network operators do not 
decide what content users can access and cannot impede 
the flow of or give preferential treatment to particular 
kinds of content. The loss of network neutrality provisions, 
in effect, removes a crucial safeguard and increases the like-
lihood of a discriminatory telecommunications system. 
 A largely straightforward question of how the net-
work will be operated has been rendered unnecessarily 
opaque by some of the actors in these debates. In particu-
lar, public relations representatives of the phone and cable 
companies who stand to gain the most from an Internet 
stripped of net neutrality protections devoted considerable 
resources toward averting consensus while maintaining a 
façade of a debate over democratic requirements for an 
open Internet. Some industry-funded “astro turf” groups 
have recast the debate as one over government regulation. 
Christopher Wolf, Co-Chair of HandsOff.org, claimed 
that “There is no established definition for the concept 
of ‘net neutrality’” and that “Such government control 
over the evolution of the Internet is unprecedented.” 2 
Similarly, former Congressman Dick Armey’s organization 
FreedomWorks advocates for such a  laissez faire regulatory 
approach. 3 Many of these claims against regulation ignore 
the fact that the federal government developed, funded, 
and directly managed the Internet for more than a quarter 
of a century (until US officials handed over network con-
trol to the private sector in the mid-1990s), and continues 
to actively regulate and subsidize the Internet. Moreover, 
many of these self-defined anti-regulation organizations 
appear oddly complacent toward heavy-handed private 
control over the Internet. 
 While groups like HandsOff seem driven by a cate-
gorical opposition against all governmental interventions, 
public interest advocates, on the other hand, tend to 
stress openness as their main concerns. Many groups and 
individuals within the “Internet freedom” coalition have 
sought net neutrality as an end in itself, while others have 
cautioned that net neutrality does not fully restore com-
mon carriage and should not be seen as a silver bullet. Josh 
Breitbart makes the important point that net neutrality is 
actually a retreat from earlier ideas such as open access and 
common carriage, which were US law prior to  Brand X : 
 Net neutrality is actually a retreat from “open 
access,” which is what we had before the Supreme 
Court’s Brand X decision. Open access applied to 
the Internet when we were using dial-up and it was 
classified as a “telecommunications service” like the 
telephone. With the telephone, that means owners 
of the lines can’t prioritize their customers’ calls over 
those of their competitors’ (net neutrality or, as it’s 
known in the phone world, “common carrier”), but 
it also means they have to lease their lines to other 
phone service providers (open access). Open access 
is how you can have real competition without hav-
ing a dozen different wires running under your street, 
through your backyard, and into your house. 4 
 As Breitbart suggests, network neutrality is inextricably 
linked to principles of “common carriage,” a bedrock prin-
ciple of telecommunications policy for nearly 100 years 
that mandated non-discriminatory service. 5 
 Making sense of what is at stake in current net neu-
trality debates requires examining key antecedents in 
telecommunications history. In the following section, we 
examine the historical context and the current param-
eters of the debate. This historical context, we argue, is 
necessary to begin imagining alternative trajectories for 
internet policy.  
 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 Prior to common carriage laws, telecommunication 
operators were able to abuse their market position. During 
the Civil War, Western Union controlled telegraph trunk 
Transcending Net Neutrality 
Continued from page 1
13
D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 8  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N E T  L A W
lines across the country and gradually achieved near 
monopolistic dominance by buying up competing compa-
nies and actively undercutting congressional and popular 
support for constructing a rival postal telegraph system. As 
its network expanded in the 20th century, Western Union 
focused on serving business clients while pricing potential 
competitors out of specific geographic markets and ignor-
ing social obligations, such as universal service. Based on 
Western Union’s business model and the larger political 
and regulatory environment, there was little incentive to 
create innovations that could have made access affordable 
for average citizens. With the rise of telephony and early 
build out of telephone networks during the early 20th 
century, public service protections were introduced into 
the telecommunications regulatory structure, including 
common carriage. 
 For decades, telephone network operators were con-
sidered “natural monopolies.” The biggest monopoly 
(and largest corporation in the world) was the American 
Telegraph and Telephone Company, which, until its 
forced 1984 breakup into the “baby bells,” dominated the 
telecommunications industry. Given its monopoly privi-
leges, it was mandated as a basic public service that AT&T 
could not discriminate against other carriers using its lines. 
Leading up to the Modified Final Judgment that broke up 
the Bell system, Judge Harold Green in 1982 maintained 
that phone companies should not sell information. At the 
time, former FCC commissioner Nicholas Johnson argued 
that allowing phone companies to provide both conduit 
and content would hurt both businesses and consumers 
instead of providing the “channels of communication for a 
democratic society.” Johnson argued that the phone com-
panies’ drive to get into the information selling business 
was the “No. 1 public policy issue confronting our nation.” 
Arguing that they already profit from both ends of the 
process, he worried that telecom providers “charge us for 
getting information out of the system and they charge the 
supplier for putting it in.” 6 Commissioner Johnson’s fears 
became even more warranted after the 1984 Cable Act 
and the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which, respec-
tively, allowed cable to remain a closed system and to 
become an Internet service provider. 
 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the first 
major overhaul of the landmark 1934 Communications 
Act and the first comprehensive attempt to reform US 
media policy for the digital era. This complex and far-
reaching legislation replaced structural regulation with 
market incentives for telephony, radio, broadcast televi-
sion, cable television, and satellite communications. 
Hailed as an effort to unshackle market forces and sold 
with the promise that deregulation leads to enhanced 
competition, the bill has instead led to unprecedented 
telecommunications conglomeration, lessened consumer 
protections, and decreased ownership diversity. However, 
taking for granted the historical importance of common 
carriage in curbing market excesses, even the deregulatory 
thrust of the 1996 Telecom Act left the principles of non-
discrimination intact. 
 This changed with the June 27, 2005, Supreme Court 
 Brand X decision and subsequent August 5, 2005, FCC 
decision to “deregulate” carriage. Culminating after a long 
legal fight between cable companies (like Comcast and 
Time Warner) and independent ISPs (like Earthlink and 
Brand X) over whether cable operators should be required 
to sell access to their networks to potential broadband 
service provision competitors, the  Brand X decision was 
significant for essentially deregulating broadband. The 
Supreme Court’s 6-3 decision favored the National Cable 
and Telecommunications Association (NCTA), the prin-
cipal trade association of the cable television industry, by 
overturning an earlier appellate court decision and affirm-
ing the FCC classification that cable broadband was an 
“information service” instead of a “telecommunications 
service,” thus exempting cable companies from common 
carriage laws.  
 This seemingly minor turn of phrase meant that cable 
providers did not have to share their infrastructure with 
competitors. Together with the subsequent FCC decision 
to extend this exemption to phone companies (ostensibly 
to provide a level playing field among market players), this 
court decision removed safeguards and created the poten-
tial for access restrictions to non-preferred content. Many 
public interest advocates pointed out how this decision 
countered 100 years of telecom policy and risked changing 
the open and non-discriminatory nature of the Internet 
while creating a new class of potential gatekeepers. 
 MONOPOLY POWER AND 
CONTENT DISCRIMINATION  
 The history of content control goes back centuries 
and bears mentioning given parallels to the outcomes that 
network neutrality advocates fear today, particularly when 
looking at the history of the US postal system. For example, 
analogies can be seen with the abortive attempt in the 
early 1790s to admit only certain newspapers into the mail. 
Congress rejected this policy when it enacted the Post 
Office Act of 1792, which put into law principles of non-
discrimination. However, content restrictions persisted, 
such as postal administrators blocking the dissemination 
of books via mail, which they argued were too bulky, and 
southerners after 1835 blocking the circulation of infor-
mation on slavery. 7 Although varying degrees of content 
discrimination have persisted, in general the opportunity 
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for anyone to send anything anywhere without constraint 
or discrimination was a fundamental assumption of this 
early US communications system. Alexis de Tocqueville, 
who credited newspapers and other information delivered 
via the post as greatly responsible for America’s thriving 
democratic culture, praised the US system. 8 
 This openness was periodically challenged, particu-
larly by the monopolistic telegraph industry, which abused 
its market power. Paul Starr notes historical parallels with 
contemporary telecommunications marketplaces in which 
incumbents dominate networks to exploit their existing 
position rather than innovate and spend little money 
on research and development, often investing more in 
politics than in technology. Similar market conditions 
exist today. Once again, first-mile telecommunications 
are heading toward near-monopoly status. This time, 
however, a crucial safeguard is missing; the Internet is no 
longer classified as a telecom service and is at risk in being 
transformed into a cable television business model. 9 
 Despite network operators assurances to the contrary, 
over the past several years there have been ominous 
glimpses of what a non-neutral network might look like. 
In 2004, North Carolina ISP Madison River blocked DSL 
customers from using its rival’s (Vonage) VOIP telephony 
services. In 2005, the Canadian telecom corporation, 
Telus, blocked users from accessing a pro-union Web 
site during a labor dispute. In 2006, AOL Time Warner 
blocked a mass email campaign from its customers that 
opposed AOL’s proposed tiered email system. In 2007, 
AT&T apparently censored a Webcast of the rock band 
Pearl Jam’s anti-Bush political commentary. Also in 2007, 
Verizon was found blocking the pro-choice organization 
NARAL’s text messages. In 2008, Bell Canada was caught 
throttling third-party DSL providers’ P2P traffic. Perhaps 
best exemplifying the potential for abusing net neutral-
ity has been Comcast, whose practices of blocking traffic 
associated with Bit Torrent, a peer-to-peer file-sharing 
system, were exposed in 2007. These are just a few of the 
more egregious infractions against net neutrality. 
 PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 Three waves of scholarship addressing the net neu-
trality debate can be discerned thus far. Although antici-
pated by earlier debates, the first phase was marked by 
Timothy Wu’s initial formulation of “network neutrality” 
in his seminal 2003 work,  Network Neutrality, Broadband 
Discrimination , where he forwarded the idea that network 
architectures should be neutral purveyors of data. 10 The 
debate simmered among a relatively small group of com-
mentators until the Supreme Court’s pivotal  Brand X 
 decision, which catapulted net neutrality to a new level of 
urgency as the prospects of tiered Internet services paral-
leling a cable television business model became a distinct 
reality. 11 
 The  Brand X decision ushered in a second wave of 
scholarship that was remarkably cautious given the stakes 
involved. For example, Eli Noam has suggested a “Third 
Way” for net neutrality limited to “Last Mile” concerns. 12 
Christian Sandvig was quick to discount some arguments 
posed by network neutrality advocates, suggesting that 
many aspects of net neutrality smacks of an old debate, 
evidenced by principles laid out by Ithiel de Sola Pool 
decades earlier. Noting that network neutrality has never 
been the norm given that all Internet providers have 
discriminated against certain types of content to some 
extent, Sandvig called for establishing a set of norma-
tive guidelines to distinguish acceptable types of traffic 
shaping. 13 Less common in this second wave were articles 
that staked out a position boldly calling for mandated net 
neutrality. 14 
 Currently, we have reached a new phase of the 
debate, one that places net neutrality provisions in a 
state of uncertainty. Although prospects seem less dire 
than when we began working on this issue in 2005-2006, 
net neutrality protections are still not codified into law. 
However, even as scholarship has become less complacent 
toward the loss of net neutrality, we submit that now is 
precisely the moment that we should be aiming beyond 
mandated net neutrality for more encompassing safeguards 
to ensure an open Internet. Much of the existing scholar-
ship and commentary fails to sufficiently emphasize the 
import of normative principles—principles regarding the 
role of the Internet in a democratic society and the debt 
that Internet providers owe to the public. When consid-
ering the fact that the four Bell companies earn roughly 
$14 billion every year from access to Internet content and 
applications in addition to $20 billion a year in direct 
access fees from broadband Internet subscribers and when 
taken in the context of the enormous tax subsidies and 
other benefits that telecom corporations receive from 
public entities, this debate should focus more on the social 
contract between telecom network operators and the pub-
lic. These kinds of social contract debates often present 
themselves during critical junctures and periods of media 
crisis. 15 The fact that network neutrality  is a normative 
principle is far too often overlooked. Industry attempts 
to reframe the debate, growing technological complexity, 
and shifting allegiances among competing actors artifi-
cially sunder democratic Internet principles that should 
be considered together. 16 
 Contrary to these general trends lies a neglected tradi-
tion located in scholarship that addresses more  normative 
concerns like open architecture, open access, and online 
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ethics. 17 Wu offers a short list of network neutrality rules 
that would prohibit carriers from discriminating content. 
Similarly, Benkler’s  Wealth of Networks advocates for a 
commons-based policy orientation. Along with Lessig 
and others, this approach is aligned with the notion of 
Cooper’s “open architecture.” 18 Drawing from the research 
of Yochai Benkler, Mark Cooper, Lawrence Lessig, Tim 
Wu, and others, we envision a more open and participa-
tory Internet. Frequently referred to as a commons-based 
approach to the management of communications systems, 
this model emphasizes cooperation and innovation as 
opposed to privatization and enclosure. Given that all 
technology is inscribed with social values that foreclose 
certain possibilities while encouraging others, emphasiz-
ing these linkages illuminates what is at stake with net-
work neutrality and situates this debate within a larger 
vision of Internet openness. We sit at a critical juncture 
for Internet policy; opportunities now abound that soon 
will disappear. 
 CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
 While net neutrality helps prevent many of the 
worst market excesses, it does little to ameliorate some 
of the systemic problems that necessitate it. Media 
conglomeration and the attendant lack of diversity of 
ownership and perspectives provide one focal point 
for discussing network neutrality. 19 From the reemer-
gence of telecommunications giant AT&T to current 
efforts by FCC Chairman Kevin Martin to relax media 
ownership restrictions, fewer players are gaining mas-
sive market share, creating increasingly vertically and 
horizontally integrated corporations with the potential 
to dominate entire market sectors. 20 By many measures, 
the current FCC regulatory environment fails to spur 
technological innovation and has retarded expansion of 
digital inclusion efforts. 21 Instead, the FCC has fostered 
a decades-long market environment fraught with pricing 
and geographical discrimination as well as overpriced, 
substandard telecommunications services. 22 
 Exacerbating difficulties in these crucial media policy 
areas are state and national telecommunications laws that 
slow innovation and competition in broadband services, 
thus creating an environment of digital exclusion. To 
date, more than a dozen states have passed laws that in 
some way limit competition and prevent innovation in 
business models, public investment, and public-private 
partnerships. 23 At the national level, everything from 
local control over local rights-of-way to consumer protec-
tions would be undermined by pending legislation.  
 While yesteryear’s newspapers and today’s Internet 
are quite different media, their social functionality 
within civil society is remarkably similar. Whereas the 
unrestricted transport of newspapers via the postal ser-
vice has long been protected and subsidized, today ISPs 
are proposing to have discriminatory power over social 
networking applications that use their networks. Using 
the postal service, anyone can send packets first-class, 
second-class, third-class, parcel post, overnight, etc. 
However, when one sends a packet, it will be handled 
in a first-in-first-out manner within the chosen service 
without regard to the type of packet being sent. Likewise, 
network neutrality incorporates strong civil rights pro-
tections simply by mandating a neutral and non-reactive 
transport medium.  
 A related issue underlies concerns over surveillance. 
Recent endeavors to surveil network traffic encroach 
upon users’ rights to privacy, creating a panoptic environ-
ment that undermines civil society, creativity, and public 
dialogue. Current law enforcement efforts should err on 
the side of maintaining network neutrality, yet often 
mandate data collection of user information that demon-
strates both a lack of understanding of the current state of 
technology and, in actuality, undermines long-term law-
enforcement goals (as discussed later in this article). The 
Communications Aid to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 
is just one example of significant risks posed to Internet 
freedom and, ironically, long-term law enforcement. 
 ABUSE OF MONOPOLY MARKET POWER 
 The rise of telephony over the past century suggests 
that our current path has been tried before. As Paul Starr 
writes in  The Creation of the Media , “From 1894 until 
1907. . . the market broke open with a surge of indepen-
dent commercial and nonprofit cooperative telephone 
enterprises.” 24 AT&T and the Bell system, however, as 
the primary owner of telephone long-distance service, 
often refused to interconnect these “independent com-
mercial and nonprofit cooperative enterprises” wherever 
they were in competition for local phone customers. 
Instead, AT&T used its long-distance monopoly to open 
3,500 new exchanges in smaller communities of less 
than 10,000 people between 1894 and 1907. As Starr 
sums up: 
 The Bell-independent rivalry at the turn of the 
century led to the same breakneck extension of 
networks that had characterized the early telegraph 
industry around 1850. . . prices for telephone service 
fell sharply. Independent phone companies gener-
ally offered lower rates than Bell, and though Bell 
cut its rates everywhere, they were lower where it 
faced a rival. 25 
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 At least until the 1913 Kingsbury Agreement, AT&T 
interconnected with “Independents” when it suited its 
needs; however, it preferred to buy out or quash these 
competitors. Today, in the wake of  Brand X , a market and 
regulatory environment has been recreated that  eliminates 
independent companies and allows backhaul owners to 
engage in similar anti-competitive practices.  
 In 1907, AT&T’s new president, Theodore Vail, 
publicly declared that telephone service should be, in 
essence, a unified, interoperable, neutral network. AT&T, 
through the judicious use of governmental regulation—for 
which AT&T often directly lobbied—was able to create a 
national interconnected telephone network and grow its 
market share dramatically during the first three decades of 
the 20th century (to 66 percent in 1920 and 81 percent 
in 1932), crushing the “home rule” telephone movement, 
thus ensuring decades of market dominance until the 1984 
divestiture. The public statements of today’s telecom-
munications leaders are explicitly interested in devising 
ways to close off their networks, maximize their billable 
minutes, and create new avenues for extracting additional 
fees for service quality, non-interference, and non-dis-
crimination. This sensibility is best exemplified by AT&T 
and statements made by its CEO, Ed Whitacre:  
 I think the content providers should be paying for 
the use of the network—obviously not the piece 
from the customer to the network, which has 
already been paid for by the customer in Internet 
access fees—but for accessing the so-called Internet 
cloud . . . If someone wants to transmit a high qual-
ity service with no interruptions and ‘guaranteed 
this, guaranteed that’, they should be willing to 
pay for that . . . They shouldn’t get on and expect 
a free ride. 26 
 An important lesson is that AT&T gained its promi-
nence not by any superior business model alone, but 
through governmental regulation, predatory pricing, 
 buying up competition, centralizing network control, and 
a dedication to creating  and controlling  a nationally inter-
connected network. Today, in much the same way it under-
mined the “home rule” telephone movement 100 years 
ago, AT&T is again attempting to leverage its network 
ownership––this time targeting not only telephone services 
but also all Internet-mediated communications, including 
data  services, streaming audio and video, and television. 
 FCC REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 Network neutrality protections treat the question 
of access as a critical element in determining whether a 
 network is being operated in an open manner. Bottlenecks 
to network access undermine the types of services offered, 
create artificial scarcity, and lead to increased pricing and 
lowered quality of service. This is exemplified by current 
national policy surrounding the licensure of the public 
airwaves. 27 Well more than 99 percent of the public air-
waves are either reserved for governmental use or licensed 
to private companies. 28 Even though the tiny sliver of 
so-called unlicensed frequencies has generated enormous 
economic activity and innovation, everything from WiFi 
devices to baby monitors, radio phones, garage-door 
openers, and microwave ovens coexist within these rare 
frequencies. 29 
 The FCC has continued to privilege a model for 
licensure that allows only a single entity to broadcast 
on a given swath of spectrum, often at a specific power 
level and geographic location. While digital technologies 
have radically transformed almost every aspect of current 
society, our licensure regime is predicated on use of the 
public airwaves as if we were still using 1920s and ’30s 
technologies. Whether one looks at the debate over low-
power FM radio licensure, interference temperature, or 
unlicensed devices in unused television broadcast bands, 
the story is invariably the same: Incumbent interests 
already invested in licensed frequencies seek to prevent 
competition by maintaining the licensure status quo and 
thereby dramatically slowing down change or stopping it 
altogether.  
 Given the accumulating evidence for broadband 
connectivity’s importance for economic development, 
purposefully limiting access to the necessary tools to 
build data communications networks is a disservice to 
the general populace. 30 Today, most wireless broadband 
providers are forced to use only a handful of unlicensed 
frequencies, creating a scarcity of capacity in dense 
urban areas. Meanwhile, rural areas are often completely 
neglected by broadband providers. Opening up large 
swaths of unlicensed frequencies would not only help 
meet current demand but also provide ample spectrum for 
future technologies such as cognitive and software defined 
radios. Yet proceedings to open up additional bands such 
as 3650-3700MHz or to open up bands to more users and 
unlicensed devices in unused 700MHz television broad-
cast frequencies continue to stagnate.  
 These same problems exist with other telecommu-
nications media. Classical economics dictate that a glut 
of supply should lower pricing. However, US broadband 
pricing remains exceptionally high despite the open secret 
that a majority of fiber infrastructure in the United States 
is “dark” and remains underused. Information on where 
this dark fiber exists and how much is available is con-
sidered a “trade secret.” In his book  Broadbandits: Inside 
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the $750 Billion Telecom Heist, Om Malik discusses the 
enormous infrastructure overbuild of the late 1990s. 31 The 
reverberating effects from this $750 billion market failure 
are still hindering US broadband development today. 
Meanwhile, the FCC has in many cases systematically 
removed the few remaining checks and balances protect-
ing US residents from corporate malfeasance and market 
excesses.  
 US BROADBAND PENETRATION RATES 
 Numerous states have passed laws restricting munici-
pal entry into broadband service provision. Prior to 2005, 
14 states created barriers to municipal broadband service 
provision, which ranged from outright bans on public 
utility districts providing retail telecommunications ser-
vices to taxes on telecommunications services provided 
by public entities (but not private providers) to increase 
their prices. 32 In response to direct lobbying by telecom-
munications incumbents, more than a dozen states have 
passed regulations restricting competition in this market 
sector. 33 As the city of New Orleans discovered during 
Hurricane Katrina, these state laws often force municipal 
entities to spend crucial resources on making their net-
works worse.  
 Stagnation of US broadband penetration rates rela-
tive to a growing number of industrialized nations is due to 
the combination of the aforementioned factors. While the 
nation continues to lag further behind, this suboptimal 
state of affairs is continually worsened by official com-
ments, reports, and protocols that purposefully confuse the 
issue and hide the extent of the problem. 34 For example, 
on July 26, 2006, the FCC released its most recent figures 
on “high-speed services for Internet access.” In previous 
years, the FCC had been lambasted for stating that 99 per-
cent of the population had access to broadband services. 
Numerous experts provided feedback on how the data 
collected by the FCC could be improved so that its report 
would provide more useful information, such as collect 
information based on census track, disaggregate satellite 
and other services, and make explicit the speeds of the 
services provided. 35 Yet, the 2006 report does almost noth-
ing to address the fundamental concerns raised. Instead, 
the FCC chose to wordsmith a “solution” that ignored the 
requested feedback, leaving many issues without redress: 
the inadequacy of the official definition for “broadband” 
as 200kbps in a single direction; the severe limitations 
of satellite as a medium for broadband service provi-
sion (in particular, speed limitations and latency, which 
severely limit its utility for streaming, VoIP, and other 
live services); and the lack of usefully disaggregated data. 
By systematically suppressing competition and erecting 
numerous barriers to entry, the FCC and telecom incum-
bents have created an environment whereby substandard 
and exorbitantly priced broadband service provision has 
become the norm.  
 TOWARD AN OPEN INTERNET 
 We synthesize existing commons-based models to 
create a more expansive standard of network  neutrality 
 conducive to Internet openness––a model that runs coun-
ter to US phone and cable companies’ plans and challenges 
the overly narrow parameters of current public interest 
arguments. Discussion among pro-and anti-network neu-
trality camps often centers on the debate over quality 
of services, bundling of services, and interconnection of 
networks. At its core, the question is whether the Internet 
should use an end-to-end infrastructure consisting of a 
dumb network or whether a centralized infrastructure 
should be used to inspect and shape network traffic based 
upon its content, origin, and/or destination; thus, sup-
porters of smart networks are often aligned with the anti-
 network neutrality camp. 36 
 Fundamental to smart networks is the idea that high-
er latency is not conducive to some services and appli-
cations. Thus, for example, VoIP (Voice over Internet 
Protocol is packet-based telephony, a replacement phone 
service) or streaming HDTV (High Definition TV) both 
require low-latency and low-jitter throughput to be use-
ful, whereas file transfers like Web surfing and email tend 
to be relatively latency-agnostic and jitter-insensitive. 
An ideal smart network would be able to distinguish 
services and applications requiring low-latency and pri-
oritize these network uses. The flip side is that low-prior-
ity network uses would find their latency increasing once 
low-latency prioritization took place. A corollary of this 
phenomenon is that latency is mainly an issue of network 
capacity; with adequate capacity, packet prioritization 
becomes a moot point. Thus, smart networks have the 
potential to create a  disincentive for system-wide capacity 
upgrades.  
 For example, within Ethernet systems, network 
neutrality might be circumvented through the use of 
the 3-bit-wide “Precedence” section of the 8-bit “Type 
of Service” field along with the existing 3-bit delay, 
throughput, and reliability quality of service parameters. 
Precedence is, for the most part, rarely used across most 
public network infrastructure (though it is more prevalent 
within private networks). While originally conceptualized 
as a mechanism for determining the prioritization of traf-
fic based on its import to network control ( e.g ., routine, 
priority, immediate, flash, flash override, CRITIC/ECP, 
Internetwork control, network control), it could also be 
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used to discriminate content based upon purchase of pre-
mium, high-speed, or tiered services. 
 Additional complexity arises in the administration of 
a packet-prioritizing network since this would necessar-
ily involve some form of packet inspection ( i.e ., to iden-
tify what type of packet is being sent and its prioritization 
level). Once system-wide prioritization levels are in place, 
an incentive exists to create software to “disguise” data as 
a higher priority form in order to speed its delivery. Thus, a 
user might “hide” instant messaging data by using a program 
that makes it appear to the network routers that these data 
are VoIP packets; someone downloading MP3 files might 
use an application that makes these data appear to be a 
streaming audio file. Network providers, knowing that this 
outcome is inevitable, would, in turn, need to do a deeper 
packet inspection, further slowing network capacity as rout-
er CPU time is used to ensure that each packet is correctly 
identified. A non-neutral network would create incentives 
for non-high-speed content providers to use high-speed 
content provision proxies to deliver content, creating 
an entire market dedicated to concealment of data-loca-
tion and counter-measures to prevent these initiatives by 
network owners and those paying premium rates to avoid 
content discrimination. Thus, without network neutrality, 
a data-obfuscation arms race would certainly develop span-
ning all aspects of the network’s infrastructure.  
 EXPANDING THE DEBATE 
 In our view, the ways in which network neutrality has 
been defined, with an emphasis on non-discriminating 
wires and common carriage, are too limited in their scope. 
Network neutrality advocates have been reacting to the 
actions of incumbents and their lobbyists instead of formu-
lating more proactive next steps. Using the current national 
conversation as a springboard, we propose a far more encom-
passing perspective to help ensure network neutrality, one 
that we believe will better enable the Internet to reach its 
democratic and participatory potentials. Our recommenda-
tions go beyond questions of open access to consider the 
broader contours of Internet architecture, including soft-
ware, hardware, wireless/broadband infrastructure, owner-
ship, economics, and open protocols and standards.  
 Our model for an open Internet contains 10 facets 
that are necessary to ensure an interoperable, intercon-
nected, non-discriminatory, global Internet. We assume 
that  competition is vital at all layers of Internet operations. 
Without this competition, market capture through path 
dependency––a situation inherently detrimental to innova-
tion and the best interests of network participants––tends 
to arise. While aspects of this analysis map onto the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model, we also 
incorporate factors that help ensure a politically neutral 
transport medium as well. In other words, “neutrality” is 
not just a technical specification; it also facilitates a social 
contract that supports equity and justice through data 
communications. Given the shortcomings of traditional 
neutral networking  conceptualizations, this approach envi-
sions a more democratic network infrastructure that: 
 1. Requires common carriage 
 2. Supports open architecture and open source driver 
development 
 3. Maintains open protocols and open standards 
 4. Facilitates an end-to-end architecture ( i.e., is based 
upon a “dumb network”) 
 5. Safeguards privacy ( e.g ., no back doors, deep packet 
inspection, etc.) 
 6. Fosters application-neutrality 
 7. Mandates low-latency and first-in/first-out ( i.e ., requires 
adequate capacity) 
 8. Ensures interoperability 
 9. Remains business-model neutral. 
 10. Is governed by its users ( i.e ., is internationally repre-
sentative and non-Amerocentric) 
 The following provides an initial skeleton for what 
these 10 facets would entail; however, this is only a first 
step toward achieving full implementation. Substantial 
work is still required to flesh out these ideas.  
 RECOMMENDATION 1: REQUIRES 
COMMON CARRIAGE 
 Common carriage ensures that network operators 
lease their lines to all potential market players, including 
municipalities, at market (wholesale) rates. Ideally, this 
would include universal service provisions and service 
level agreements. As has been seen repeatedly throughout 
the history of transportation and telecommunications, 
common carriage protects the general public against price 
and geographic discrimination and other anti- competitive 
business practices. Since 2000, the number of Internet 
service providers has nearly halved (from 8,450 in 2001 
to 4,417 in 2005). With the demise of common carriage 
provisions resulting from the  Brand X Supreme Court 
decision, this number will continue to decrease. 
 RECOMMENDATION 2: SUPPORTS OPEN 
ARCHITECTURE AND OPEN SOURCE 
DRIVER DEVELOPMENT  
 Open architecture and open source driver develop-
ment encourage a digital commons by keeping both the 
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hardware itself and any hardware access layer(s) open. As 
the open source movement gains ground (especially inter-
nationally) and hardware prices have plummeted, new 
business models have arisen to promulgate market capture 
and path dependence, creating potentials for secondary 
network closure. 37 Open architectures and access layers 
help promote competition by creating opportunities for 
new market entrants and rapid innovation of features and 
functionality. 
 RECOMMENDATION 3: MAINTAINS OPEN 
PROTOCOLS AND OPEN STANDARDS 
 Maintaining open protocols and standards helps 
ensure free-flowing, non-enclosed Internet services. This, 
in turn, facilitates innovation and widespread adoption of 
technologies. With the growing pull toward proprietary 
networking (especially within the wireless medium), it is 
vitally important to prevent the so-called Balkanization 
of the Internet. Protocols and standards are the building 
blocks for everything from interoperability to end-to-end 
connectivity. 
 RECOMMENDATION 4: SUPPORTS 
AN END-TO-END ARCHITECTURE 
 End-to-end architectures (E2E) help remove 
 vulnerabilities to bottlenecks, gate-keeping, illegal 
surveillance by telcos, etc. E2E helps speed network 
throughput and increases network capacity while 
lowering network equipment costs and supporting 
peer-to-peer communications. An end-to-end archi-
tecture helps prevent both governmental and corporate 
interference in network traffic, an outcome that is 
especially important at a time when surveillance and 
digital rights management concerns are increasingly 
prevalent. 
 RECOMMENDATION 5: 
SAFEGUARDS PRIVACY 
 Private networks do not privilege state security 
imperatives that compromise individual privacy rights 
and help ensure a non-discriminatory environment for 
content access and information dissemination. Private 
networking is essential since back doors and other 
devices introduce both enormous security holes as well 
as increased impetus for development and widespread 
adoption of privacy software that hampers, over the long-
term, legitimate law enforcement efforts. Privacy is also 
essential for ensuring the continued expansion of online 
business. 38 
 RECOMMENDATION 6: FOSTERS 
APPLICATION-NEUTRALITY 
 With application neutrality, Internet television, 
VoIP, and diverse operating systems and services run 
unimpeded. Expected convergences in digital commu-
nications make this principle increasingly crucial to the 
long-term growth and health of the Internet. Digital 
Rights Management (DRM) considerations such as copy-
right also make this a critical facet for a more open 
Internet. In much the same way that telephone systems 
are neutral transport mediums for voice communications, 
the Internet must remain free from discriminatory prac-
tices that privilege some applications, services, or features 
over others. 
 RECOMMENDATION 7: MANDATES 
LOW-LATENCY AND FIRST-IN/FIRST-OUT 
 Low-latency and first-in/first-out helps remove the 
impetus for data packet and application discrimination by 
requiring that a service provider’s profit margins adhere 
to the fundamental basic corporate responsibility to pro-
vide adequate services to its customers. These mandates 
help lower over-subscription rates, artificial scarcity, and 
the hoarding of dark fiber assets by mandating adequate 
capacity and providing incentive for network and capac-
ity upgrades. 
 RECOMMENDATION 8: 
ENSURES INTEROPERABILITY 
 Interoperability harmonizes different systems and 
integrates foreign attachments. This is especially impor-
tant to the continued global expansion of broadband 
service provision. As Cooper points out, interoperability 
lowers costs while increasing the collaborative potential 
of the Internet. Interoperability is critical to ensuring that 
the 80 percent of humanity who are not currently online 
will be able to interconnect with next generation tele-
communications infrastructures. 
 RECOMMENDATION 9: REMAINS 
BUSINESS-MODEL NEUTRAL 
 A business-model-neutral infrastructure allows 
for public players such as municipalities and non-
 profits, as well as public-private partnerships and private 
 corporations, to provide Internet services. Too often, 
competition is lessened, and the options for consum-
ers to receive broadband services artificially limited, 
by shortsighted rules, regulations, and laws. A neutral 
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network cannot exist when limited to specific business 
models.  
 RECOMMENDATION 10: IS GOVERNED 
BY ITS USERS 
 We recommend replacing and/or dramatically expand-
ing control over important governance institutions like 
ICANN in a way that internationalizes control over such a 
vital global resource. The current US-controlled ICANN 
model is unsustainable over the long term. 39 Expanding 
governance would also help remove artificial scarcity and 
hoarding of IPv4 addresses. As Milton Mueller and others 
have documented, control over global communications 
networks and the Internet, in particular, has remained 
Amerocentric. 40 Moreover, purportedly representative 
bodies like ICANN and the Regional Internet Registries 
(RIRs) often appear to privilege industry interests.  
 CONCLUSION 
 We submit that the implementation of these 10 prin-
ciples will create a more participatory Internet. On a fun-
damental level, an open system is key to network growth 
and innovation. We acknowledge that our model does not 
address all material inequities, such as digital divide and 
lack of universal service issues, which, to be sufficiently 
remedied, require a redistribution of critical resources. 
Nor do we tackle some issues related to copyright, surveil-
lance, and other contemporary political battles. However, 
our recommendations, if enacted, could improve the 
global deficit in Internet connectivity and help propel 
the United States toward its goals of universal, affordable 
broadband. These principles could help establish norma-
tive parameters to guide policy makers, both national and 
global, in their quest to create a better Internet. Ideally, 
these principles will be presented as a broadband democ-
racy manifesto to be endorsed by members of Congress, 
state legislatures, and political candidates. Although 
piecemeal efforts are better than no movement at all, 
only if approached in tandem will these steps constitute a 
model for the Internet that is simultaneously open, demo-
cratic, and efficient. 
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